Introduction
T he primary concern in this chapter is to conceptualise the personal relationships that developed between Mubarak with certain businessmen. This chapter argues that there are businessmen who did not engage in politics, for example, by running for parliamentary elections or joining political parties but who developed personal clientelistic relationships with Mubarak as well as with high-level government officials like businessmen Ahmed Bahgat and Mohamed Nosseir. Other businessmen, such as Naguib Sawiris (hereafter referred to as Naguib to avoid confusion with the rest of his family members) and his family, created network relationships with the Mubarak family. In these traditional clientelistic relations, businessmen varied in their proximity to Mubarak, his family, and highlevel government officials, which had implications for the reallocation and abuse of state resources (for example, the selling of state-owned lands and state-owned enterprises at reduced prices, tax evasion, and the borrowing of public bank loans without collateral).
Then, in return for benefiting from economic liberalization through their personal relationships with Mubarak, his family, or high-level government officials, these businessmen provided support for the survival of Mubarak's authoritarian regime. For instance, they provided television and newspaper support to Mubarak, his family, and his regime, as well as philanthropic and charitable activities to compensate for the state's withdrawal from the provision of social services. On the other hand, businessmen who failed to enter into patron-client relationships with the regime have been subject to coercion in their businesses, as in the case of Wagih Siag. This chapter builds on the work of John Sfakianakis, 1 who argues that Egypt's economic reform provided an opportunity for the emergence of network relations, which helped Mubarak's regime survive and enriched his ruling coalitions, including businessmen and bureaucrats who turned into businessmen. But my findings are distinct from Sfakianakis's, since I argue that there are businessmen, like Hussein Salem, and bureaucrats who turned into businessmen, such as Minister of Housing Ibrahim Soliman, who entered into patron-client relations with Mubarak and his family, and their role was not limited to providing support for the survival of Mubarak's authoritarianism; they also contributed to the enrichment of the Mubarak family. As Amr Adly writes, "The Mubaraks [served] as the nodes of broader networks of state officials and crony businessmen. In this setting, Mubarak and his sons would use their formal and informal leverage to issue public acts that would allocate public assets and market positions to people who are closely allied to them with the final aim of self-enrichment . . . [In] this pattern of self-enrichment . . . the state ceases to pursue public good and serves the private interest of its rulers and their associates."
